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Abstract
This paper shows how to solve dynamic agency models by extending recursive
Lagrangean techniques a` la Marcet and Marimon (2009) to problems with hidden
actions. The method has many advantages with respect to promised utilities ap-
proach (Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990)): it is a significant improvement in
terms of simplicity, tractability and computational speed. Solutions can be eas-
ily computed for hidden actions models with several endogenous state variables
and several agents, while the promised utilities approach becomes extremely dif-
ficult and computationally intensive even with just one state variable or two
agents. Several numerical examples illustrate how this methodology outperforms
the standard approach.
1 Introduction
This paper shows how to solve repeated moral hazard models using recursive La-
grangean techniques. In particular, this approach can be used in the analysis of dy-
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namic hidden-actions models with several endogenous state variables and many agents.
While these models are extremely complicated to solve with commonly used solution
strategies, my methodology is simpler and numerically faster than the alternatives.
The recent literature on dynamic principal-agent models is vast1. Typically these
models do not have closed form solution, therefore it is necessary to solve them numeri-
cally. The main technical difficulty is the history dependence of the optimal allocation:
the principal must keep track of the whole history of shock realizations, use it to ex-
tract information about the agent’s unobservable behavior, and reward or punish the
agent accordingly. As a consequence, it is not possible to derive a standard recursive
representation of the principal’s intertemporal maximization problem. The traditional
way of dealing with this complication is based on the promised utilities approach: the
dynamic program is transformed into an auxiliary problem with the same solution,
in which the principal chooses allocations and the agent’s future continuation value,
taking as given the continuation value chosen in the previous period. The latter (also
called promised utility) incorporates the whole history of the game, and hence becomes
a new endogenous state variable to be chosen optimally. By using a standard argument,
due to Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990) (APS henceforth) among others, it can be
shown that the auxiliary problem has a recursive representation in a new state space
that includes the continuation value and the state variables of the original problem.
However, there is an additional complication: in order for the auxiliary problem to be
equivalent to the original one, promised utilities must belong to a particular set (call it
the feasible set), which has to be characterized numerically before computation of the
optimal allocation2. It is trivial to characterize this set if there is just one exogenous
shock, but it becomes complicated, if not computationally unfeasible, in models with
several endogenous states or with many agents. Therefore, with this approach, there is
a large class of models that we cannot analyze even with numerical methods.
This paper provides a way to overcome the limits of the promised utilities approach:
under assumptions that justify the use of the first-order approach3, it extends the recur-
1Many contributions have focused on the case in which agent’s consumption is observable (see for
example Rogerson (1985a), Spear and Srivastava (1987), Thomas and Worrall (1990), Phelan and
Townsend (1991), Fernandes and Phelan (2000)) and more recently on the case in which agents can
secretly save and borrow (Werning (2001), Abraham and Pavoni (2008, 2009)); other works have
explored what happens in presence of more than one agent (see e.g. Zhao (2007) and Friedman
(1998)), while few researchers have extended the setup to production economies with capital (Clementi
et al. (2008a,2008b)). Among applications, a non-exhaustive list includes unemployment insurance
(Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), Shimer and Werning (forthcoming), Werning (2002), Pavoni (2007,
forthcoming)), executive compensation (Clementi et al. (2008a,2008b), Clementi et al. (2006), Atkeson
and Cole (2008)), entrepreneurship (Quadrini (2004), Paulson et al. (2006)), credit markets (Lehnert
et al. (1999), and many more.
2The feasible set is the fixed point of a set-operator (see APS for details). The standard numerical
algorithm proposed by APS starts with a large initial set, and iteratively converges to the fixed
point. Sleet and Yeltekin (2003) and Judd, Conklin and Yeltekin (2003) provide two efficient ways of
computing it.
3The first-order approach, consisting of the substitution of the incentive-compatibility constraint
with the first-order conditions of the agent’s maximization problem with respect to hidden actions, is
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sive Lagrangean techniques developed in Marcet and Marimon (2009) (MM henceforth)
to the dynamic agency model. These techniques are well understood and widely used
for full information problems of optimal policy and enforcement frictions, but MM do
not analyze their applicability to environments with private information. Sleet and Yel-
tekin (2008a) make a crucial contribution in applying recursive Lagrangean techniques
to dynamic models with privately observed idiosyncratic preference shocks. This paper
instead focuses on a particular class of dynamic models with hidden actions, i.e. models
that admit the use of the first-order approach4.
The approach can be better illustrated in a dynamic principal-agent model such
as the one in Spear and Srivastava (1987), where no endogenous state variables are
present. The recursive Lagrangean formulation of this model has a straightforward
interpretation: the optimal contract can be characterized by maximizing a weighted
sum of the lifetime utilities of the principal and the agent (i.e., a utilitarian social
welfare function), where in each period the social planner optimally updates the weight
of the agent in order to enforce an incentive compatible allocation. These Pareto-
Negishi weights5 become the new state variables that ”recursify” the dynamic agency
problem. In particular, this endogenously evolving weight summarizes the contract’s
promises according to which the agent is rewarded or punished. Imagine, for simplicity,
that there are only two possible realizations for output, either ”good” or ”bad”. The
contract promises that, if tomorrow a ”good” realization of the output is observed, the
Pareto-Negishi weight will increase, therefore the principal will care more about the
expected discounted utility of the agent from tomorrow on. Analogously, if a ”bad”
outcome happens, the Pareto-Negishi weight will decrease, hence the principal will care
less about the expected discounted utility of the agent from tomorrow on. An optimal
contract chooses the sequence of Pareto-Negishi weights in such a way that rewards and
punishments are incentive compatible.
Under this interpretation, it is easy to understand why the recursive Lagrangean
approach is simpler than APS: it does not require the additional step of characterizing
widely used in the solution of static models with moral hazard since the seminal work of Mirrlees (1975).
Unfortunately, as Mirrlees pointed out, this approach is not justified in all setups. The literature has
provided several sets of assumptions that guarantee its validity.
4This paper is different from Sleet and Yeltekin (2008a) in two aspects, besides the focus on a
different type of private information. Firstly, the structure of the hidden shocks framework is such
that Sleet and Yeltekin (2008a) can use recursive Lagrangeans directly on the original problem without
need of a first-order approach. Secondly, they mainly focus on theoretical aspects of the method, while
this paper also aims at providing an efficient way of characterizing the numerical solution. A third and
minor difference is technical: they do not exploit the homogeneity of the value and policy functions,
which is crucial in my proof strategy and in numerical applications. Their work is complementary
to this paper in the analysis of dynamic models with asymmetric information. They also use their
techniques in several applied papers, for example Sleet and Yeltekin (2008b) and Sleet and Yeltekin
(2006).
5Lustig and Chien (2005) use the term ”Pareto-Negishi weight” in a model of an endowment
economy with limited enforcement, where agents face both aggregate and idyosyncratic shocks. In
their work, the weight of each agent evolves stochastically in order to keep track of occasionally
binding enforcement constraints. Sleet and Yeltekin, in their papers, use the same terminology.
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a feasible set for the new state variables, as we did with APS for continuation values. In
the recursive Lagrangean approach, the social welfare function maximization problem
is well defined for any real-valued weight6.
This line of reasoning can be easily extended to more general problems of repeated
moral hazard with many agents and many observable endogenous state variables. The
dynamic optimization problem has a recursive formulation based on Pareto-Negishi
weights and the endogenous state variables. These weights are updated in each period
to enforce an incentive compatible allocation, while the endogenous states follow their
own law of motion. Also in these more complicated environments there is no need for
characterizing the feasible set of Pareto-Negishi weights. Given this, the main gain
in using recursive Lagrangeans is in terms of tractability, since we eliminate the often
intractable step of characterizing feasible values for the auxiliary problem, a crucial
aspect of the APS approach.
Extending the recursive Lagrangean approach to models with endogenous unob-
servable state variables is more challenging. In particular, it is well known that the
first-order approach is rarely justified in these cases, and we do not have sufficient
conditions that guarantee its validity. However, we can follow a ”solve-and-verify” ap-
proach along the lines of Abraham and Pavoni (2009): first solve the problem with
recursive Lagrangeans, using the first-order approach7, and then verify that the agent
does not have incentives to deviate from the choices implied by the optimal contract.
The last verification step can be done with standard dynamic programming techniques,
as Abraham and Pavoni suggested in their work.
This paper also propose an efficient way to compute the optimal contract based on
the theoretical results. The idea is to find approximated policy functions by solving
Lagrangean first-order conditions. The procedure is an application of the collocation
method (see Judd (1998)). The algorithm is simple: firstly, approximate the policy
functions for allocations, Lagrange multipliers, agents’ and principal’s continuation val-
ues over a set of grid nodes, with standard interpolation techniques, either splines or
Chebychev polynomials depending on the particular application. Then look for the
coefficients of these approximated policy functions that satisfy Lagrangean first-order
conditions. The gain in terms of computational speed is large: as a benchmark, in
a state-of-the-art laptop, the Fortran code provided by Abraham and Pavoni (2009)
solves a model with hidden effort and hidden assets accumulation in 15 hours, while
my Matlab code obtains an accurate solution in around 20 seconds. This large com-
putational gain is obtained for two reasons. The first has already been mentioned: we
do not need to find a feasible set for Pareto-Negishi weights. The second reason is that
solving a system of nonlinear equations is much faster than value function iteration (the
standard algorithm used for promised utility approach)8.
6This is also valid for the recursive Lagrangeans approach in dynamic optimization problems with
full information. For a discussion of this issue, see Marcet and Marimon (2009).
7Notice that we need to use the agent’s first-order conditions with respect to all unobservable choice
variables.
8The proposed procedure is a local characterization of the saddle-point, and therefore second-order
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The paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides an illustration of the recursive
Lagrangean approach in a simple dynamic principal-agent model; section 3 contains a
more general theorem for problems with several endogenous state variables and more
than one agent; section 4 discusses how the recursive Lagrangean approach can be used
in models with unobservable endogenous states and illustrates these ideas in a model
with hidden effort and hidden asset accumulation; section 5 explains the details of the
algorithm, and provides some numerical examples and a performance analysis of the
algorithm in terms of accuracy and computational speed; section 6 concludes.
2 An illustration with a simple dynamic agency model
In order to illustrate the Lagrangean approach, it is easier to start with a dynamic
agency problem without endogenous states, as in Spear and Srivastava (1987). This is
helpful in understanding the differences between this approach and the promised utility
method.
The economy is inhabited by a risk neutral principal and a risk averse agent. Time
is discrete, and the state of the world follows an observable Markov process {st}
∞
t=0,
where st ∈ S, and card(S) = I. The realizations of the process are public information.
Denote the single realizations with subscripts, and the histories with superscripts:
st ≡ {s0, ..., st} ∈ S
t+1
In each period, the agent gets a state-contingent income flow y (st), enjoys consumption
ct (s
t), receives a transfer τt (s
t) from the principal, and exerts a costly unobservable
action at (s
t) ∈ A ⊆ R+, and A is bounded. I will refer to at (s
t) as action or effort.
The costly action affects the future probability distribution of the state of the world.
For simplicity, let ŝi, i = 1, 2, ..., I be the possible realizations of {st} and let them be or-
dered such that y (st = ŝ1) < y (st = ŝ2) < ... < y (st = ŝI). Let π (st+1 = ŝi | st, at (s
t))
be the probability that state tomorrow is ŝi ∈ S conditional on past state and effort
exerted by the agent at the beginning of the period9, with π (s0 = ŝI) = 1. Assume π (·)
is twice continuously differentiable in at (s
t) with pia(·)
pi(·)
bounded, and has full support :
π (st+1 = ŝi | st, a) > 0 ∀i, ∀a, ∀st. Let Π (s
t+1 | s0, a
t (st)) =
∏t
j=0 π (sj+1 | sj, aj (s
j))
be the probability of history st+1 induced by the history of unobserved actions at (st) ≡
(a0 (s
0) , a1 (s
1) , ..., at (s
t)).
The instantaneous utility of the agents is
u
(
ct
(
st
))
− υ
(
at
(
st
))
conditions can be an issue. The researcher can control for this problem by starting from different
initial conditions and checking if the algorithm always converges to the same solution. All examples
presented in my paper are robust to this check.
9Notice that shocks can be persistent. In the numerical examples, the focus is on i.i.d. shocks, but
it should be clear that persistence neither creates particular theoretical nor numerical problems.
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with u (·) strictly increasing, strictly concave and satisfying Inada conditions, while
υ (·) is strictly increasing and strictly convex; both are twice continuously differentiable.
The instantaneous utility is uniformly bounded. The agent does not accumulate assets
autonomously: the only source of insurance is the principal. The budget constraint of
the agent will be simply
ct
(
st
)
= y (st) + τt
(
st
)
∀st, t ≥ 0.
Both principal and agent are fully committed once they sign the contract at time zero.
A feasible contract (or allocation) W in this framework is a plan (a∞, c∞, τ∞) ≡
{at (s
t) , ct (s
t) , τt (s
t) ∀st ∈ St+1}
∞
t=0 that belongs to the following set:
ΓMH ≡
{
(a∞, c∞, τ∞) : at
(
st
)
∈ A, ct
(
st
)
≥ 0,
τt
(
st
)
= ct
(
st
)
− y (st) ∀s
t ∈ St+1, t ≥ 0
}
.
Assume, for simplicity, that the agent and the principal have the same discount factor.
The principal evaluates allocations according to the following
P (s0;a
∞, c∞, τ∞) = −
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
βtτt
(
st
)
Π
(
st | s0, a
t−1
(
st−1
))
=
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
βt
[
y (st)− ct
(
st
)]
Π
(
st | s0, a
t−1
(
st−1
))
(1)
therefore the principal can characterize efficient contracts by maximizing (1), subject
to incentive compatibility and to the requirement of providing at least a minimum level
of ex-ante utility V out to the agent:
W (s0) = max
{at(st),ct(st)}
∞
t=0∈Γ
MH
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
βt
[
y (st)− ct
(
st
)]
Π
(
st | s0, a
t−1
(
st−1
))
s.t. a∞ ∈ arg max
{at(st)}
∞
t=0
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
βt
[
u
(
ct
(
st
))
− υ
(
at
(
st
))]
Π
(
st | s0, a
t−1
(
st−1
))
(2)
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
βt
[
u
(
ct
(
st
))
− υ
(
at
(
st
))]
Π
(
st | s0, a
t−1
(
st−1
))
≥ V out. (3)
Call this the original problem. Notice that the sequence of effort choices in (2) is
the optimal solution of the agent’s maximization problem, given the contract offered
by the principal. If the agent’s optimization problem is well-behaved, this sequence
can be characterized by the first-order conditions of the agent’s optimization problem.
In that case, it is possible to use the agent’s first-order conditions as constraints in
the principal’s dynamic problem. This solution strategy is commonly known in the
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literature as the first-order approach. For this simple setup, there are well known
conditions in the literature that guarantee the validity of the first-order approach, i.e.
that guarantee that the problem with first-order conditions is equivalent to the original
problem and therefore delivers the same solution. In the rest of this section assume
that Rogerson (1985b) conditions of monotone likelihood ratio (MLRC) and convexity
of the distribution (CDFC) are satisfied. These conditions are sufficient to guarantee
the validity of the first-order approach in this simple setup10.
If the first-order approach is justified, the agent’s first order conditions with respect
to effort can be substituted into the principal’s problem. The agent, given the principal’s
strategy profile τ∞ ≡ {τt (s
t)}
∞
t=0 , solves
V (s0; τ
∞) = max
{ct(st),at(st)}
∞
t=0∈Γ
MH
{
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
βt
[
u
(
ct
(
st
))
− υ
(
at
(
st
))]
Π
(
st | s0, a
t−1
(
st−1
))}
.
The first order condition for effort is
υ′
(
at
(
st
) )
=
∞∑
j=1
βj
∑
st+j |st
πa
(
st+1 | st, at
(
st
))
× (4)
×
[
u
(
ct+j
(
st+j
))
− υ
(
at+j
(
st+j
))]
Π
(
st+j | st+1, at+j
(
st+j | st+1
))
.
Intuitively, the marginal cost of effort today (LHS) has to be equal to future expected
benefits (RHS) in terms of expected future utility. The use of (4) is crucial, since
it allows to write the Lagrangean of the principal’s problem. In the following, for
simplicity I refer to (4) as the incentive-compatibility constraint (ICC).
Rewrite the Pareto problem of the principal as
W (s0) = max
{at(st),ct(st)}
∞
t=0∈Γ
MH
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
βt
[
y (st)− ct
(
st
)]
Π
(
st | s0, a
t−1
(
st−1
))
s.t. υ′
(
at
(
st
) )
=
∞∑
j=1
βj
∑
st+j |st
πa (st+1 | st, at (s
t))
π (st+1 | st, at (st))
× (5)
×
[
u
(
ct+j
(
st+j
))
− υ
(
at+j
(
st+j
))]
Π
(
st+j | st, at+j−1
(
st+j−1 | st
))
∀st, t ≥ 0
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
βt
[
u
(
ct
(
st
))
− υ
(
at
(
st
))]
Π
(
st | s0, a
t−1
(
st−1
))
≥ V out.
10For static problems, Jewitt (1988) provides another set of sufficient conditions, which can be
used in alternative to Rogerson’s to guarantee the feasibility of a first-order approach. Notice that
both Rogerson’s and Jewitt’s conditions are sufficient for dynamic agency setups with observable
endogenous states. He (2010) suggests a fixed-point condition that justifies the first-order approach in
static environments, which can potentially also be used in dynamic settings.
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2.1 The Lagrangean approach
It is trivial to show that (3) must be binding in the optimum. Given this consideration,
Problem (5) can be seen as the constrained maximization of a social welfare function,
where the Pareto weight for the principal and the agent are, respectively, 1 and γ:
W SWF (s0) = max
{at(st),ct(st)}
∞
t=0∈Γ
MH
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
βt
[
y (st)− ct
(
st
)]
Π
(
st | s0, a
t−1
(
st−1
))
+
+ γ
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
βt
[
u
(
ct
(
st
))
− υ
(
at
(
st
))]
Π
(
st | s0, a
t−1
(
st−1
))
(6)
s.t. υ′
(
at
(
st
) )
=
∞∑
j=1
βj
∑
st+j|st
πa (st+1 | st, at (s
t))
π (st+1 | st, at (st))
×
×
[
u
(
ct+j
(
st+j
))
− υ
(
at+j
(
st+j
))]
Π
(
st+j | st, at+j−1
(
st+j−1 | st
))
where γ is a function of V out in the original problem11. Let βtλt (s
t) Π (st | s0, a
t−1 (st−1))
be the Lagrange multiplier associated to each ICC. The Lagrangean is:
L (s0, γ, c
∞,a∞, λ∞) =
=
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
βt
{
y (st)− ct
(
st
)
+ γ
[
u
(
ct
(
st
))
− υ
(
at
(
st
))]}
Π
(
st | s0, a
t−1
(
st−1
))
+
−
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
βtλt
(
st
)υ′ (at (st) )−
∞∑
j=1
βj
∑
st+j |st
πa (st+1 | st, at (s
t))
π (st+1 | st, at (st))
×
×
[
u
(
ct+j
(
st+j
))
− υ
(
at+j
(
st+j
))]
Π
(
st+j | st, at+j−1
(
st+j−1 | st
))}
×
× Π
(
st | s0, a
t−1
(
st−1
))
The Lagrangean can be manipulated with simple algebra to get the following expression:
L (s0, γ,c
∞, a∞, λ∞) =
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
βt
{
y (st)− ct
(
st
)
+ φt
(
st
) [
u
(
ct
(
st
))
− υ
(
at
(
st
))]
+
−λt
(
st
)
υ′
(
at
(
st
))}
Π
(
st | s0, a
t−1
(
st−1
))
11To see how we can rewrite the original problem as a social welfare maximization, notice that
equation (3) must be binding in the optimum: otherwise, the principal can increase her expected
discounted utility by asking the agent to increase effort in period 0 by δ > 0, provided that δ is small
enough. Therefore, we can associate a strictly positive Lagrange multiplier (say, γ) to (3), which
will be a function of V out. This Lagrange multiplier can be seen as a Pareto-Negishi weight on the
agent’s utility. I can fully characterize the Pareto frontier of this economy by solving the problem for
different values of γ between zero and infinity. Moreover, notice that by fixing γ, V out will appear in
the Lagrangean only in the constant term γV out, thus it will be irrelevant for the optimal allocation
and can be dropped.
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where
φt
(
st−1, st
)
= γ +
t−1∑
i=0
λi
(
si
) πa (si+1 | si, ai (si))
π (si+1 | si, ai (si))
The intuition is simple. For any st, λt (s
t) is the shadow cost of implementing an
incentive compatible allocation, i.e. the amount of resources that the principal must
spend to implement an incentive compatible contract. The expression
pia(st+1|st,at(st))
pi(st+1|st,at(st))
is a measure of the informativeness of output as a signal for effort, and therefore an
indirect measure of the effect of effort on the observed result. Rewrite the definition of
φ (st) as:
φt+1
(
st, ŝ
)
= φt
(
st
)
+ λt
(
st
) πa (st+1 = ŝ | st, at (st))
π (st+1 = ŝ | st, at (st))
∀ŝ ∈ S (7)
φ0
(
s0
)
= γ
Therefore, from (7) we can see φt (s
t) as the Pareto-Negishi weight of the agent’s lifetime
utility, that evolves endogenously in order to track the agent’s effort. The optimal
contract promises that the weight in t+1 will differ from the weight in t by an amount
equal to the shadow cost λt (s
t) multiplied by a measure of the effect of effort on the
output distribution.
2.2 Recursive formulation
Marcet and Marimon (2009) show that, for full information problems with forward-
looking constraints, the Lagrangean has a recursive structure and can be used to find a
solution of the original problem. The question is therefore whether the same arguments
can also be used in the principal-agent framework. By the duality theory (see for
example Luenberger (1969)), a solution of the original problem corresponds to a saddle
point of the Lagrangean12, i.e. the contract
(c∞∗, a∞∗, τ∞∗) =
{
c∗t
(
st
)
, a∗t
(
st
)
, y (st)− c
∗
t
(
st
)
∀st ∈ St+1
}∞
t=0
is a solution for the original problem if there exist a sequence {λ∗t (s
t) ∀st ∈ St+1}
∞
t=0 of
Lagrange multipliers such that (c∞∗, a∞∗, λ∞∗) = {c∗t (s
t) , a∗t (s
t) , λ∗t (s
t) ∀st ∈ St+1}
∞
t=0
satisfy:
L (s0, γ,c
∞, a∞, λ∞∗) ≤ L (s0, γ,c
∞∗, a∞∗, λ∞∗) ≤ L (s0, γ,c
∞∗, a∞∗, λ∞)
Finding these sequences can be complicated. However, had this Lagrangean problem a
recursive representation, it would be possible to characterize the solutions with standard
numerical methods that exploit dynamic programming arguments. This is the focus
12Notice that, in my setup, the conditions stated by Marcet and Marimon (2009) for equivalence
between the saddle-point solution of the Lagrangean and the solution of the original problem are
satisfied.
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of this section. In particular, value and policy functions (or correspondences, more
generally) are shown to depend on the state of the world st and the Pareto-Negishi
weight φt (s
t).
I follow the strategy of MM by showing that a generalized version of Problem (6) is
recursive in an enlarged state space. The generalized version of (6) is:
W SWFθ (s0) = max
{at(st),ct(st)}
∞
t=0∈Γ
MH
φ
0
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
βt
[
y (st)− ct
(
st
)]
Π
(
st | s0, a
t−1
(
st−1
))
+
+ γ
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
βt
(
u
(
ct
(
st
))
− υ
(
at
(
st
)))
Π
(
st | s0, a
t−1
(
st−1
))
s.t. υ′
(
at
(
st
))
=
∞∑
j=1
βj
∑
st+j |st
πa (st+1 | st, at (s
t))
π (st+1 | st, at (st))
×
×
[
u
(
ct+j
(
st+j
))
− υ
(
at+j
(
st+j
))]
Π
(
st+j | st, at+j−1
(
st+j−1 | st
))
∀st, t ≥ 0
Notice that if φ
0
= 1, then we are back to (6). Write down the Lagrangean of this
problem by assigning a Lagrange multiplier βtλt (s
t) Π (st | s0, a
t−1 (st−1)) to each ICC
constraint:
Lθ (s0, γ, c
∞,a∞, λ∞) =
=
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
βt
{
φ
0 [
y (st)− ct
(
st
)]
+ γ
[
u
(
ct
(
st
))
− υ
(
at
(
st
))]}
Π
(
st | s0, a
t−1
(
st−1
))
+
−
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
βtλt
(
st
)υ′ (at (st) )−
∞∑
j=1
βj
∑
st+j |st
πa (st+1 | st, at (s
t))
π (st+1 | st, at (st))
×
×
[
u
(
ct+j
(
st+j
))
− υ
(
at+j
(
st+j
))]
Π
(
st+j | st, at+j−1
(
st+j−1 | st
))}
×
× Π
(
st | s0, a
t−1
(
st−1
))
Notice that r (a, c, s) ≡ y (s)− c is uniformly bounded by natural debt limits, so there
exists a lower bound κ such that r (a, c, s) ≥ κ. We can therefore define κ < κ
1−β
.
Define ϕ (φ, λ, a, s′) ≡ φ+ λpia(s
′|s,a)
pi(s′|s,a)
, hP0 (a, c, s) ≡ r (a, c, s), h
P
1 (a, c, s) ≡ r (a, c, s)− κ,
hICC0 (a, c, s) ≡ u (c) − υ (a), h
ICC
1 (a, c, s) ≡ −υ
′ (a), θ ≡
[
φ0 φ
]
∈ R2, χ ≡
[
λ0 λ
]
and
h (a, c, θ, χ, s) ≡ θh0 (a, c, s) + χh1 (a, c, s)
≡
[
φ0 φ
] [ hP0 (a, c, s)
hICC0 (a, c, s)
]
+
[
λ0 λ
] [ hP1 (a, c, s)
hICC1 (a, c, s)
]
which is homogenous of degree 1 in (θ, χ). The Lagrangean can be written as:
Lθ (s0, γ, c
∞,a∞, χ∞) =
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
βth
(
at
(
st
)
, ct
(
st
)
, θt
(
st
)
, χt
(
st
)
, st
)
Π
(
st | s0, a
t−1
(
st−1
))
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where
θt+1
(
st, ŝ
)
= ϕ
(
θt
(
st
)
, χt
(
st
)
, at
(
st
)
, ŝ
)
∀ŝ ∈ S
θ0
(
s0
)
=
[
φ
0
γ
]
The constraint defined by hP1 (a, c, s) is never binding by definition, therefore λ
0
t (s
t) = 0
and φ0t (s
t) = φ
0
∀st, t ≥ 0, which implies that the only relevant state variable is φt (s
t).
The next step is to show that all solutions of the Lagrangean have a recursive struc-
ture. This is done in two steps. Firstly, Proposition 1 proves that a particular functional
equation (the saddle point functional equation) associated with the Lagrangean satisfies
the assumptions of the Contraction Mapping Theorem. This functional equation is the
equivalent of a Bellman equation for saddle point problems. Secondly, it must hold
that solutions of the functional equation are solutions of the Lagrangean and viceversa.
This is a trivial application of MM (Theorems 3 and 4) and therefore it is omitted13.
Associate the following saddle point functional equation to the Lagrangean
J (s, θ) = min
χ
max
a,c
{
h (a, c, θ, χ, s) + β
∑
s′
π (s′ | s, a) J (s′, θ′ (s′))
}
(8)
s.t. θ′ (s′) = θ + χ
πa (s
′ | s, a)
π (s′ | s, a)
∀s′
In order to show that there is a unique value function J (s, θ) that solves Problem (8), it
is sufficient to prove that the operator on the right hand side of the functional equation
is a contraction14.
There are two technical differences with the original framework in MM. Firstly, the
law of motion for Pareto-Negishi weights depends (non-linearly) on the current alloca-
tion, while in MM it only depends (linearly) on the Lagrange multipliers. Secondly, the
probability distribution of the future states is endogenous and depends on the optimal
effort at (s
t). Therefore, on a first inspection, the problem looks much more complicated
than the standard MM setup. However, Proposition 1 shows that MM’s arguments also
work here.
13Messner and Pavoni (2004) show an example with full information in which the policy function that
solves the saddle point functional equation can be suboptimal or even unfeasible. To avoid these issues,
though, it is sufficient to impose that the policy function satisfies all the constraints of the original
problem. Since I solve for the Lagrangean first-order conditions, I always impose all the constraints.
14In general, this problem will yield a unique value function and a policy correspondence. In the rest
of the paper, assume the policy correspondence is single-valued, i.e. it is a policy function. Marimon,
Messner and Pavoni (2009) generalize the arguments of MM for policy correspondence, and similar
ideas can be used in my setup.
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Proposition 1 Fix an arbitrary constant K > 0 and let Kθ = max {K,K ‖θ‖}. The
operator
(TKf) (s, θ) ≡ min
{χ>0:‖χ‖≤Kθ}
max
a,c
{
h (a, c, θ, χ, s) + β
∑
s′
π (s′ | s, a) f (s′, θ′ (s′))
}
s.t. θ′ (s′) = θ + χ
πa (s
′ | s, a)
π (s′ | s, a)
∀s′
is a contraction.
Proof. Appendix A.
Proposition 1 shows that the saddle point problem is recursive in the state space
(s, θ) ∈ S×R2. Notice that the result of Proposition 1 is valid for anyK > 0. Moreover,
whenever the Lagrangean has a solution, the Lagrange multipliers are bounded (see
MM for further discussion of this issue). Hence, a recursive solution of Problem (8)
is a solution of the Lagrangean, and more importantly it is a solution of the original
problem. As a consequence, it is enough to restrict the search for optimal contracts
to the set of policy functions that are Markovian in the space (s, θ) ∈ S × R2. But
remember that the first element of θ is constant for any t and hence the only relevant
endogenous state is φt (s
t). Therefore, from this point of view, finding the optimal
contract has the same numerical complexity as finding the optimal allocations in a
standard RBC model15.
2.3 The meaning of Pareto-Negishi weights
To better understand the role of φt (s
t), assume there are only two possible realizations
of the state of nature: st ∈ {sL, sH}. At time t, the weight is equal to φt. In period t+1,
given our assumption on the likelihood ratio, the Pareto-Negishi weight is higher than
φt if the principal observes sH , while it is lower than φt if she observes sL (a formal proof
of this fact is obtained in Lemma 1 in Appendix A). Therefore the principal promises
that the agent will be rewarded with a higher weight in the social welfare function (i.e.,
the principal will care more about him) if a good state of nature is observed, while it
will be punished with a lower weight (i.e., the principal will care less about him) if a
bad state of nature happens.
Appendix A contains some standard results of dynamic agency theory obtained by
using Pareto-Negishi weights. The famous immiseration result16 of Thomas and Worrall
15Notice that, since in the Lagrangean formulation the constant γV out was eliminated, the value of
the original problem is:
W (s0) =W
SWF (s0)− γV
out = J
(
s0, [ 1 γ ]
)
− γV out
where V out = V (s0; τ
∞∗) is the agent’s lifetime utility implied by the optimal contract.
16The immiseration result states that agent’s consumption goes almost surely to its lower bound in
an optimal contract.
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(1990) is implied by Proposition 3, where I show that the Pareto-Negishi weight is a
non-negative martingale which almost surely converges to zero.
2.4 A comparison with APS
It is interesting to compare this result with the promised utility approach. The APS
recursive formulation in (9) is based on the continuation values of the agent:
P (U, s) = max
{c,{U(s′)}s′∈S ,a∗}
[
y (s)− c+ β
∑
s′
π (s′ | s, a∗)P (U (s′) , s′)
]
(9)
s.t. u (c)− υ (a∗) + β
∑
s′
π (s′ | s, a∗)U (s′) = U (10)
a∗ = argmax
a∈A
{
u (c)− υ (a) + β
∑
s′
π (s′ | s, a∗)U (s′)
}
(11)
U (s′) ∈ U (12)
where (10) is the promise-keeping constraint, (11) is the incentive compatibility con-
straint, and (12) constrains the continuation values to belong to the feasible set U ,
which is the fixed point of the operator:
B (W ) =
{
U ∈W : u (c)− υ (a∗) + β
∑
s′ π (s
′ | s, a∗)U (s′) = U
a∗ = argmaxa∈A {u (c)− υ (a) + β
∑
s′ π (s
′ | s, a∗)U (s′)}
}
The principal enforces incentive compatible contracts by promising the agent a higher
continuation value if a good state of nature is observed in the future, and a lower
continuation value if a bad state is observed. The two methodologies, therefore, differ
in the way they make and enforce promises, but they both have the same number
of state variables. Notice however that the APS technique needs to characterize the
feasible set for continuation values by solving the fixed point problem B (U) = U ,
while in the recursive Lagrangean approach the problem is well defined for any Pareto-
Negishi weight in the real line. Therefore, because of this additional step in the promised
utilities method, the Lagrangean approach is simpler than the APS one. However, in
this framework, the characterization of U is easy: the feasible set is an interval, and the
extrema of this interval can be found with standard algorithms. Things become more
complicated when there are several agents and endogenous state variables. This is the
subject of the next section.
3 A more general theorem
In this section, I derive a generalization of Proposition 1 for the case in which there
are observable endogenous state variables and several agents. Suppose that all the
13
assumptions in MM are satisfied. In the following, when needed, other assumptions on
the primitives of the model will be specified.
Assume there are N agents indexed by i = 1, ..., N . Each agent is subject to an
observable Markov state process {sit}
∞
t=0, where sit ∈ Si, si0 is known, and the process
is common knowledge. The process is independent across agents. Let S ≡
N
×
i=1
Si and
st ≡ {s1t, ..., sNt} ∈ S be the state of nature in the economy, let s
t ≡ {s0, ..., st} be
the history of these realizations. Let wt (s
t) ≡ (w1t (s
t) , ..., wNt (s
t)) for any generic
variable w, and let W =
N
×
i=1
Wi for any generic set W .
Each agent exerts a costly action ait (s
t) ∈ Ai, where Ai is a convex subset of R.
This action is unobservable to other players, and it affects the next period distribution
of states of nature. Let πi (si,t+1 | sit, ait (s
t)) be the probability that state is si,t+1 con-
ditional on both the past state and the effort exerted by the agent i in period t. There-
fore, since the processes are independent across agents, define Π (st+1 | s0, a
t (st)) =∏N
i=1
∏t
j=0 π
i (si,j+1 | sij , aij (s
j)) to be the cumulated probability of history st+1 given
the whole history of unobserved actions at (st) ≡ (a0 (s
0) , a1 (s
1) , ..., at (s
t)). Prob-
abilities πi (si,t+1 | sit, ait (s
t)) are differentiable in ait (s
t) as many time as necessary.
Denote the derivative with respect to ait (s
t) as πia (si,t+1 | sit, ait (s
t)), and assume the
likelihood ratio is bounded. Allocations are indicated by the vector ςit (s
t) ∈ Υi. Each
agent is endowed with a vector of endogenous state variables xit (s
t) ∈ Xi, Xi ⊆ R
m
convex, that evolve according to the following laws of motion:
xi,t+1
(
st, st+1
)
= ℓi
(
xit
(
st
)
, ςit
(
st
)
, ait
(
st
)
, si,t+1
)
The (uniformly bounded) per-period payoff function of each agent is given by
ri (ςi, ai, xi, s)
and ri : Υi × Ai ×Xi × S → R is non-decreasing in ςi, decreasing in ai, concave in xi
and strictly concave in (ςi, ai), (at least) once continuously differentiable in (ςi, xi) and
twice continuously differentiable in ai. The resource constraint is
17:
p
(
xt
(
st
)
, ςt
(
st
)
, at
(
st
)
, st
)
≥ 0
Notice that the standard principal-agent setup belongs to this class of models, if we
set N = 2, Xi = ∅, r
P (ςi, ai, xi, s) ≡ y(s) − cA, r
A (ςi, ai, xi, s) ≡ u(cA) − v(aA),
and we assume that the principal does not exert effort or her effort has no impact on
the distribution of the state of nature. More generally, the result in this section can
be extended to the case in which only a subset of agents has a moral hazard problem.
However, the notation becomes burdensome, hence for expositional purposes it is better
17Constraints that involve future endogenous variables, like participation constraints or Euler equa-
tions, can be incorporated by following the standard MM approach. Since they only complicate the
notation, they are not included in the analysis.
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to stick with the case where all agents involved in the contract have a moral hazard
problem.
A feasible contractW is a triplet of sequences (ς∞, a∞, x∞) ≡ {ςt (s
t) , at (s
t) , xt (s
t)}
∞
t=0
∀st ∈ St+1 that belongs to the set:
ΓGT ≡
{
(ς∞, a∞, x∞) : at
(
st
)
∈ A, ςt
(
st
)
∈ Υ, xt
(
st
)
∈ X,
xi,t+1
(
st, st+1
)
= ℓi
(
xit
(
st
)
, ςit
(
st
)
, ait
(
st
)
, si,t+1
)
∀i,
p
(
xt
(
st
)
, ςt
(
st
)
, at
(
st
)
, st
)
≥ 0 ∀st ∈ St+1, t ≥ 0
}
Let ω ≡ {ωi}
N
i=1 ∈ R
N be a vector of initial Pareto-Negishi weights, and assume the use
of the first-order approach (FOA) is justified18. To avoid burdensome notation, in the
following I do not explicitly indicate the measurability of each allocation with respect
to history st. Since FOA is valid, we can use the first-order conditions of the agents’
problems with respect to hidden actions as incentive compatibility constraints:
ria (ςit, ait, xit, st) +
∞∑
j=1
∑
st+j
βj
πia (si,t+1 | sit, ait)
πi (si,t+1 | sit, ait)
×
× ri (ςi,t+j , ai,t+j, xi,t+j , st+j)Π
(
st+j | st+j−1, at+j−1
)
= 0 ∀i = 1, ..., N (13)
The constrained efficient allocation is the solution of the following maximization prob-
lem:
P (s0) = max
W∈ΓGT
{
N∑
i=1
∞∑
t=0
βt
∑
st
ωir
i (ςit, ait, xit, st) Π
(
st | st−1, at−1
)}
s.t. (13)
Let βtλit (s
t)Π (st | st−1, at−1) be the Lagrange multiplier for the incentive-compatibility
constraint (13) of agent i. Substitute for the resource constraint and write the La-
grangean as:
L (s0, ω,W, λ
∞) =
=
N∑
i=1
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
βt
{
φitr
i (ςit, ait, xit, st)+ +
+λitr
i
a (ςit, ait, xit, st)
}
Π
(
st | st−1, at−1
)
where, for any i,
xi,t+1
(
st, st+1
)
= ℓi
(
xit
(
st
)
, ςit
(
st
)
, ait
(
st
)
, si,t+1
)
φi,t+1
(
st, st+1
)
= φit
(
st
)
+ λit
(
st
) πia (si,t+1 | sit, ait (st))
πi (si,t+1 | sit, ait (st))
φi0 (s0) = ωi, xi0 given
18It is easy to see that, in this setup as well, standard sufficient conditions for the static principal-
agent problem will justify the validity of the first-order approach.
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The newly defined variables φit (s
t), i = 1, ..., N , are endogenously evolving Pareto-
Negishi weights which have the same interpretation as in the previous section: they are
optimally chosen by the planner to implement an incentive compatible allocation and
they summarize the contract’s (history-dependent) promises for each agent.
3.1 Recursivity
Notice that this problem is already in the form of a social welfare function maximization.
Let ϕi (φi, λi, ai, s
′) ≡ φi + λi
piia(s′i|si,ai)
pii(s′i|si,ai)
, hi0 (ς, a, x, s) ≡ r
i (ςi, ai, xi, s), h
i
1 (ς, a, x, s) ≡
ria (ςi, ai, xi, s), and
h (ς, a, x, φ, λ, s) ≡ φh0 (ς, a, x, s) + λh1 (ς, a, x, s)
which is homogenous of degree 1 in (φ, λ). The Lagrangean can be written as:
L (s0, ω, ς
∞, a∞, x∞, λ∞) =
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
βth (ςt, at, xt, φt, λt, st) Π
(
st | s0, a
t−1
(
st−1
))
where
xt+1
(
st, ŝ
)
= ℓ
(
xt
(
st
)
, ςt
(
st
)
, at
(
st
)
, ŝ
)
φt+1
(
st, ŝ
)
= ϕ
(
φt
(
st
)
, λt
(
st
)
, at
(
st
)
, ŝ
)
∀ŝ ∈ S
φ0
(
s0
)
= ω, xi0 given
The corresponding saddle point functional equation is
J (s, φ, x) = min
λ
max
ς,a
{
h (ς, a, x, φ, λ, s) + β
∑
s′
π (s′ | s, a) J (s′, φ′ (s′) , x′ (s′))
}
(14)
s.t. x′ (s′) = ℓ (x, ς, a, s′)
φ′ (s′) = ϕ (φ, λ, a, s′) ∀s′
Proposition 2 shows that the operator on the RHS of (14) is a contraction. The proof is
a simple repetition of the steps followed to prove Proposition 1, in a different functional
space.
Proposition 2 Fix an arbitrary constant K > 0 and let Kθ = max {K,K ‖φ‖}. The
operator
(TKf) (s, φ, x) ≡ min
{λ>0:‖λ‖≤Kθ}
max
ς,a
{
h (ς, a, x, φ, λ, s) + β
∑
s′
π (s′ | s, a) f (s′, φ′ (s′) , x′ (s′))
}
s.t. x′ (s′) = ℓ (x, ς, a, s′)
φ′ (s′) = ϕ (φ, λ, a, s′) ∀s′
16
is a contraction.
Proof. Straightforward by repeating the steps to prove Proposition 1 in the following
space of functions:
M =
{
f : S × RN ×X −→ R s.t.
a) ∀α > 0 f (·, αφ, ·) = αf (·, φ, ·)
b) f (s, ·, ·) is continuous and bounded }
with norm
‖f‖ = sup {|f (s, φ, x)| : ‖φ‖ ≤ 1, s ∈ S, x ∈ X}
Using the same arguments as in section 2, a recursive solution of the original problem
can be found by solving the functional equation (14), provided that the optimal policy
correspondence is single-valued.
Notice that this problem has N(m+1) state variables. However, the value function
of the problem is homogenous of degree one in the vector of endogenous weights φ. This
fact implies:
1
φ1
J (s, φ1, ..., φN , x) = J
(
s, 1,
φ2
φ1
, ...,
φN
φ1
, x
)
≡ J˜
(
s,
φ2
φ1
, ...,
φN
φ1
, x
)
therefore the dimension of the state space is reduced to N(m + 1) − 1. Moreover,
the individual continuation values for each agent i are homogeneous of degree zero
with respect to the vector of endogenous weights φ19. These two facts are helpful in
computational applications.
3.2 A comparison with APS
In this more general framework, the promised utility approach gives a recursive formu-
lation which uses a new state space including continuation values U it and the natural
states variables xt of the problem:
19This is a consequence of the homogeneity of degree one of the planner’s value function. MM show
that individual continuation values must satisfy an individual saddle-point functional equation, and
they must be homogeneous of degree zero in order to satisfy the functional equation (14). The same
argument holds in the current setup.
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P
(
{Ui, xi}i=1,...,N , s
)
= max{
{ci,a∗i ,{U i(s′),x′i(s′)}s′∈S}i=1,...,N
}{[∑
i
ωir
i (ςi, a
∗
i , xi, s)
]
+ β
∑
s′
π (s′ | s, a∗)P
({
U i (s′) , x′i (s
′)
}
i=1,...,N
, s′
)}
s.t. ri (ςi, a
∗
i , xi, s) + β
∑
s′
π (s′ | s, a∗)U i (s′) = Ui i = 1, ..., N (15)
a∗i = arg max
ai∈Ai
{
ri (ςi, ai, xi, s) + β
∑
s′
π
(
s′ | s, (ai, a
∗
−i)
)
U i (s′)
}
i = 1, ..., N
(16)
x′i (s
′) = ℓi (xi, ςi, a
∗
i , s
′) i = 1, ..., N, p (x, ς, a∗, s) ≥ 0 ∀s ∈ S, U i (s′) ∈ U (x)
(17)
where (15) is the promise-keeping constraint, (16) is the incentive compatibility con-
straint, and the value correspondence U (x) ⊂ RN , U : X ⇉ RN in (17) is the fixed
point of the operator:
B (W (x)) =

{Ui}i=1,..,N ∈W (x) : r
i (ςi, a
∗
i , xi, s) + β
∑
s′ π (s
′ | s, a∗)U i (s′) = Ui
a∗i = argmaxai∈Ai
{
ri (ςi, ai, xi, s) + β
∑
s′ π
(
s′ | s, (ai, a
∗
−i)
)
U i (s′)
}
x′i (s
′) = ℓi (xi, ςi, a
∗
i , s
′) i = 1, ..., N, p (x, ς, a∗, s) ≥ 0 ∀s ∈ S

Notice that this formulation has N(m+1) state variables like the recursive Lagrangean
problem. However, the correspondence U (x) is very complicated to characterize even
for small values of N and m. While in the case of section 2 the correspondence U was
actually one interval, here there is a different interval for any point of the state space X.
Computing this family of intervals is already a formidable task for the case N +m = 3.
There are algorithms that allow an efficient computation of the approximated corre-
spondence (see e.g. Sleet and Yeltekin (2003)), but the complexity of the task increases
exponentially with the number of agents and the number of endogenous state variables.
This does not happen with the Lagrangean approach, where the characterization of the
feasible set is absent.
4 Hidden endogenous states
Proposition 2 refers to cases in which all the endogenous state variables are observable.
What happens in the case of unobservable endogenous states? In principle, it is possible
to follow the same general idea of combining the first-order approach and the recursive
Lagrangean: solve the agent’s maximization problem with respect to unobservable vari-
ables (in this case, effort and the endogenous unobservable state variables) by taking
first-order conditions, and use the latter as constraints in the planner’s problem. In
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general, first-order conditions for unobservable state variables will be forward-looking,
and hence they will fit in the standard MM framework.
However, there is a caveat: the use of the first-order approach in these models is
very restrictive (see Kocherlakota (2004) for an example). Moreover, to the best of my
knowledge, there are no sufficient conditions that make sure the first-order approach is
justified in dynamic models with unobservable endogenous states20. One possibility is to
verify numerically if the first-order approach is valid, along the lines of the verification
algorithm suggested by Abraham and Pavoni (2009). In the rest of this section, as an
example, the model in Abraham and Pavoni (2009) (AP from here on) with hidden
effort and hidden assets is studied with recursive Lagrangeans (details on recursivity
and the verification procedure are relegated in Appendix B). In the numerical section,
I will provide a computed example in which the verification procedure guarantees we
can use the first-order approach.
4.1 Repeated moral hazard with hidden saving and borrowing
Let {bt (s
t)}∞t=−1, b−1 given, be a sequence of one-period bond holdings, each of which
costs the agent 1 today and returns R tomorrow. Assume that the principal cannot
monitor the bond market, so that the asset accumulation is unobservable to her21. Then
agent’s budget constraint becomes:
ct
(
st
)
+ bt
(
st
)
= y (st) + τt
(
st
)
+Rbt−1
(
st−1
)
while the instantaneous utility function for the agent is the same as in section 2. The
agent’s problem is:
V˜ (s0, b−1; τ
∞) =
= max
{ct(st),bt(st),at(st)}
∞
t=0∈Γ
HA
{
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
βt
[
u
(
ct
(
st
))
− υ
(
at
(
st
))]
Π
(
st | s0, a
t−1
(
st−1
))}
20Abraham and Pavoni (2008) and Koehne (2009) provide sufficient conditions for the two-period
case, but their conditions cannot be easily extended to a multiperiod setting.
21Werning (2001, 2002) and AP analyze a model with hidden effort and hidden assets. This problem
generates a continuum of incentive constraints (for each possible income realization, there is a con-
tinuum of possible asset positions for which we have to specify an incentive compatibility constraint).
Hence the feasible set of continuation values has infinite dimension and APS techniques cannot be
used. In order to overcome this issue, they characterize the optimal contract by defining an auxiliary
problem, where agent’s first-order conditions over effort and bonds are used as constraints for the prin-
cipal’s problem. They show that the solution of their auxiliary problem is characterized by three state
variables (income, promised utility and consumption marginal utility), and can be solved recursively
by value function iteration. AP also provide a numerical ex-post procedure to verify if the first-order
approach delivers the true incentive compatible allocation. Even if their work is big step ahead in the
analysis of this class of models, the use of APS arguments makes their numerical algorithm too slow
for calibration purposes, and any extension of the model is computationally unmanageable.
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where
ΓHA ≡
{
(a∞, c∞, b∞, τ∞) : at
(
st
)
∈ A, ct
(
st
)
≥ 0,
ct
(
st
)
+ bt
(
st
)
= y (st) + τt
(
st
)
+Rbt−1
(
st−1
)
∀st ∈ St+1, t ≥ 0
}
The first-order approach, in this framework, amounts to taking first order conditions
with respect to all unobservable variables, i.e. effort and bond holdings. The resulting
constraints are equation (4) as in section 2, and the following Euler equation:
u′
(
ct
(
st
))
= βR
∑
st+1
u′
(
ct+1
(
st, st+1
))
π
(
st+1 | st, at
(
st
) )
(18)
The presence of hidden assets requires both (4) and (18) to be included in the set of
constraints for the principal’s problem.
4.2 The recursive Lagrangean
Let βtηt (s
t)Π (st | s0, a
t−1 (st−1)) be the Lagrange multiplier for equation (18), and
βtλt (s
t)Π (st | s0, a
t−1 (st−1)) the Lagrange multiplier for (4). The Lagrangean can be
manipulated to get:
L (s0, γ,c
∞, a∞, λ∞, η∞) =
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
βt
{
y (st)− ct
(
st
)
+ φt
(
st
) [
u
(
ct
(
st
))
− υ
(
at
(
st
))]
+
−λt
(
st
)
υ′
(
at
(
st
))
+
[
ηt
(
st
)
− Rζt
(
st
)]
uc
(
ct
(
st
))}
Π
(
st | s0, a
t−1
(
st−1
))
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where
φt+1
(
st, ŝ
)
= φt
(
st
)
+ λt
(
st
) πa (st+1 = ŝ | st, at (st))
π (st+1 = ŝ | st, at (st))
∀ŝ ∈ S and φ0
(
s0
)
= γ
ζt+1
(
st, ŝ
)
= ηt
(
st
)
∀ŝ ∈ S and ζ0
(
s0
)
= 0
This problem is characterized by two costate variables: the Pareto weight φt (s
t) and the
new costate ζt (s
t), which keeps track of the Euler equation. Using the same arguments
of Proposition 1, it is possible to show that the problem is recursive in the state space
that includes (s, φ, ζ) as states variables (see Proposition 4 in Appendix B for details).
As mentioned above, since it is not sure that the first-order approach is justified, it is
necessary to verify numerically that the agent actually likes the optimal contract, i.e.
that there are no profitable deviations for the agent. Appendix B suggests a numerical
algorithm based on AP’s verification procedure that checks the validity of the first-order
approach.
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5 Numerical examples
In this section, I describe the algorithm and I provide four computed examples.
5.1 The algorithm
For simplicity, the Markov process has only two possible realizations (Si ≡ {s
L, sH}
for any i, sL < sH). Assume the state is i.i.d., and use the simpler notation πj (ait) =
πi (si,t+1 = s
j | ait), j = L,H . Define a generic state of the economy as ŝ ∈ S where S ≡
N
×
i=1
Si, and let π (ŝ | at) ≡ π (st+1 = ŝ | at) =
∏N
i=1 π
i (si,t+1 = ŝi | ait). The numerical
procedure is a collocation algorithm (see Judd (1998)) over the first-order conditions of
the Lagrangean. From the recursive formulation we know that policy functions depend
on the natural states of the problem and on the costates (i.e., Pareto weights) that come
out from the Lagrangean approach. Let ς be the vector of allocations (including hidden
actions), χ be the vector of Lagrange multipliers, x ∈ X be the vector of natural states,
and θ ∈ Θ be the vector of costates, and define R (s, ς, χ, x, θ) as the objective function
in the saddle point functional equation, and ri (s, ς, χ, x, θ) as the instantaneous utility
function for the agent i. The algorithm therefore is the following:
1. Fix ωi, i = 1, ..., N and define a discrete grid G ⊂ S ×X × Θ for natural states
and costates.
2. Approximate policy functions for allocations ς and Lagrange multipliers χ, the
value function of the principal J and agents’ continuation value U i using cubic
splines or Chebychev polynomials, and set initial conditions for the approximation
coefficients.
3. For any (s, x, θ) ∈ G, use a nonlinear solver 22 to solve for the Lagrangean first
order conditions and the following equations for the continuation value U i and
the value function J :
U i (s, x, θ) = ri (s, ς, χ, x, θ) + β
∑
ŝ
π (ŝ | at)U
i (ŝ, x′, θ′(ŝ)) (20)
J (s, x, θ) = R (s, ς, χ, x, θ) + β
∑
ŝ
π (ŝ | at) J (ŝ, x
′, θ′(ŝ)) (21)
I use the Miranda-Fackler Compecon toolbox for function approximation. In all
applications, steps 1-3 are applied first to a grid with very few gridpoints, and then
the accuracy of the approximation is increased by applying steps 1-3 to a finer grid.
Typically, a good approximation is obtained with few grid points. Due to the use of a
non-linear equation solver, it is crucial to find good initial conditions for the parameters
22 In all applications presented in this paper, I use a version of the Broyden algorithm coded by
Michael Reiter.
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of the interpolants. In general, it is a good idea to start from the solution of a simpler
model (e.g., for the hidden effort and hidden assets problem, start from the solution of
the basic repeated moral hazard model). Homotopy methods help if the latter is not
enough. The algorithm is coded in Matlab23.
5.2 Examples
5.2.1 Repeated moral hazard
In order to make the algorithm clear, the first example of a standard repeated moral
hazard setup is explained with all the details. Let simplify the notation by writing
a generic variable as xt instead of xt (s
t). Assume that the income process has two
possible realizations (yL = y
(
sL
)
and yH = y
(
sH
)
).
The Lagrangean first-order conditions are
ct : u
′ (ct) =
1
φt
(22)
at : 0 = −λtυ
′′ (at)− φtυ
′ (at) + βπa (at)
[
J
(
yH, φt+1
)
− J
(
yL, φt+1
)]
+ (23)
+ βλt
π (at) ∂
(
pia(at)
pi(at)
)
∂at
[
u (ct+1)− υ (at+1) | yt+1 = y
H
]
+
+ (1− π (at))
∂
(
−pia(at)
1−pi(at)
)
∂at
[
u (ct+1)− υ (at+1) | yt+1 = y
L
]
λt : 0 = −υ
′ (at) + βπa (at)
[
U
(
yH, φHt+1
)
− U
(
yL, φLt+1
)]
(24)
Fix γ and choose a discrete grid for φt that contains γ. Approximate with cubic splines
a, λ, U and J on each grid node. Consumption is obtained directly from φ by using
(22): c = u′
−1
(φ−1). There are four non-linear equations left: (23), (24), (20) and (21).
I choose the following functional forms:
u (c) =
c1−σ
1− σ
υ (a) = αaε
π (a) = aν , a ∈ (0, 1)
The baseline parameters are summarized in the table:
α ε ν σ yL yH β γ
0.5 2 0.5 2 0 1 0.95 0.5955
23The basic code can be downloaded from my website or I can send it by email.
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The algorithm delivers a set of parameterized policy functions. Figure 1 shows
consumption, effort, the next period Pareto weights and the ICC Lagrange multiplier
as functions of the current state φ. Consumption is increasing in φ, while effort is
decreasing in the Pareto weight. Notice also that the policy functions for the Pareto
weights satisfy Lemma 1 in Appendix A. The Lagrange multiplier, interestingly, is
an increasing function of the current state: as long as φ increases (i.e., as long as the
realizations of high income is preponderant), the shadow cost of enforcing an incentive
compatible allocation decreases.
Figure 2 plots the parameterized policy functions for transfers, the continuation
value of the agent and the value function of the principal. Transfers are increasing
in φ, as is agent’s lifetime utility. On the contrary, the planner’s value is monotone
decreasing and convex in the Pareto weight.
Figure 3 and 4 show the average allocations across 50 thousands independent simu-
lations for 200 periods, starting with y0 = y
H . In general, these simulations are in line
with previous studies: average consumption decreases while average effort increases. As
in Thomas and Worrall (1990), the average path for agent’s lifetime utility is decreasing,
while the Lagrange multiplier λ is reduced on average along the optimal path. Inter-
estingly, φ does not show a monotone pattern. To understand the last plot of Figure
4, notice that it is possible to derive the asset holdings implied by optimal allocations
(Appendix C shows the details). According to the simulations, average assets must
decrease across time24.
Finally, Figure 5 shows the Pareto frontier: it is decreasing and strictly concave.
5.2.2 Hidden assets
This is a computed example for the model presented in section 4. Functional forms and
parameters are the same as in the previous example. Policy functions for consumption,
agent lifetime utility and λ are depicted in Figure 6 and 7 are strictly increasing and
concave in both costates, while effort is strictly decreasing and convex.
The simulated series in Figure 8 and 9 confirm the results in Abraham and Pavoni:
on average, consumption and lifetime utility increase across time, while effort decreases.
Asset holdings (see Appendix C to see how they are calculated) also increase on average.
Finally, Figure 10 shows the Pareto frontier for different ζ0 (the natural one is
zero): it is decreasing and strictly concave. An application of the verification procedure
described in the Appendix B shows that the first-order approach is justified.
5.2.3 Risk sharing
Two identical agents that must share their income in an endowment economy (hence
there are no endogenous state variables). There is two-sided moral hazard: they can
exert unobservable effort that affect the future distribution of income realization. In
24The asset holdings in the simulation can be interpreted as the saving pattern of an agent in a
decentralization of the optimal contract.
23
terms of the Proposition 2, let N = 2, ςi ≡ ci, r
i (ςi, ai, s) ≡ u (ci)− v (ai). Theoretical
and numerical results for this model are analyzed in detail in Mele (2009), therefore I
report a synthesis of them.
I solve the model for the case where agents have the same initial weight in the
social welfare function, with the same functional forms and parameters of the previous
examples, except for income realizations:
αi εi νi σi y
L
i y
H
i β ωi
0.5 2 0.5 2 .4 .6 0.95 0.5
It is possible to show that, due to the homogeneity properties of value and policy
functions, the relevant state variable in this economy is the ratio of endogenous Pareto
weights for agent 1 and 2: θ ≡ φ2
φ1
. From the Lagrangean’s first-order conditions I
obtain θ = u
′(c1)
u′(c2)
and it can be shown that θ is a submartingale25. The variable θ can
be interpreted as a measure of consumption inequality, and given the submartingale
characterization, it should be very persistent. These results are in line with theoretical
and numerical findings in Zhao (2007) and Friedman (1998). Figures 11 and 12 show
that agent 1’s consumption and lifetime utility are decreasing in θ for any possible state
of the world while effort is increasing in θ. Obviously, the contrary is true for agent 2.
Figure 13 and 14 show a sample path of 200 periods. Notice that θ is very persistent
as expected. Finally, Figure 15 shows a decreasing, strictly concave Pareto frontier.
5.2.4 Risk sharing in a production economy
This example extends the risk sharing model to a production economy. As for the
endowment economy, I present a summary of the results contained in Mele (2009) for
more detailed analysis. Each agent can now produce income by using capital. The
production function is subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks, and their distribu-
tion is affected by unobservable effort. The law of motion for capital is standard. I
keep the same functional forms of the risk sharing example, and I choose the following
production function for both agents:
f(kit) = Aitk
ρ
it
where At is the productivity shock which is affected by the unobservable effort. The
baseline parameters are summarized in the folowing table:
αi εi νi σi A
L
i A
H
i β ωi δi ρi k
i
0
0.05 2 0.1 2 0.45 0.55 0.95 0.5 0.06 0.3 3.1
Also in this case, we can use the homogeneity properties of value and policy functions
to reduce the state space: the relevant state variables are the ratio of Pareto weights
25Work in progress is trying to characterize the long run properties of θ.
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θ ≡ φ2
φ1
and the capital holdings of each agent ki, i = 1, 2. The main difference with
respect to the endowment economy is that the persistence in consumption inequality
has long-run consequences on the optimal path for capital, and therefore on the long-run
path for production.
The following simulation results assume that agents are identical and equally weighted
at time zero. Figures 16 and 17 show a simulated sample path for this setup. Both
consumption and investment are very volatile. Notice also that consumption inequality
is very persistent, and this is reflected in the path of expected discounted utilities of
each agent.
The average allocations based on 50000 simulations with a horizon of 500 periods
are presented in Figure 18 and 19. The main result is the divergence of capital in the
long run. This is due to the history dependence of investment: in each period, it is
better to invest a little more in the production technology that has a better history of
shocks, i.e. in the richest country. The ratio of Pareto weights θ keeps track of the
history, it is increasing on average. It is therefore different from 1 in the long run. The
agent that accumulates the most capital is also the agent that exerts the most effort.
5.3 Computational speed and accuracy
The following tables present results for several performance tests. In order to test the
computational speed of the algorithm and the accuracy of the approximated solution,
the codes solve the examples for different number of grid points. Let M be the number
of grid points in each dimension of the state space, e.g. with three endogenous state
variables the grid has a total of M3 grid points. The general message of this exercise
is that it is possible to get an accurate solution in few seconds even with relatively few
grid points. The hardware is a HP Pavilion dv6700 Notebook PC, with a processor
Intel Core2 Duo T5450 at 1.66 GHz and 3 GB RAM.
The accuracy of the approximated solution can be tested by defining a large grid
(with roughly 100000 linearly spaced grid points) and calculating the error of the La-
grangean first-order conditions for each grid point under the approximated solution.
In the following tables, there are two statistics that measure accuracy: the maximum
error and the norm of the error vector.
Table 1: Speed and Accuracy. Repeated Moral Hazard
Grid points Time (sec) Max Error Norm(Error)
10 4.54 5.468001e-005 1.102151e-002
15 6.23 7.766462e-006 1.830439e-003
20 6.93 2.689196e-006 4.700367e-004
30 8.56 3.956188e-007 8.931410e-005
50 12.38 3.828380e-008 6.437146e-006
100 25.20 3.382069e-009 5.187055e-007
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Table 1 reports results for the simplest repeated moral hazard model. The com-
putational time is in the order of few seconds, and a fairly good accuracy (i.e., the
maximum error is of the order of less than 10−5) is obtained with few grid points.
Table 2: Speed and Accuracy. Hidden Assets
Grid points Time (sec) Max Error Norm(Error)
4 3.61 8.185706e-004 1.366256e-001
6 5.70 6.107623e-004 6.481781e-002
8 9.10 1.347988e-004 1.511452e-002
10 13.55 5.534577e-005 5.425800e-003
12 24.80 2.373655e-005 2.409307e-003
15 84.05 7.876450e-006 8.739442e-004
20 132.72 5.343009e-006 3.026376e-004
Table 2 refers to the case with hidden assets. Also in this case, the computational
time is in the order of few seconds. As before, a high accuracy does not require a
very fine grid. It is worth mentioning again that the Fortran code of Abraham and
Pavoni (2009) runs for around 15 hours before finding a solution. Therefore, the gain in
terms of computational intensity is huge (remember that the code for the Lagrangean
approach is written in Matlab, which is a much slower programming language than
Fortran).
Table 3: Speed and Accuracy. Risk Sharing, Endowment Economy
Grid points Time (sec) Max Error Norm(Error)
10 5.29 5.181706e-006 8.094645e-004
15 6.92 1.228476e-006 1.589214e-004
20 7.85 4.318931e-007 5.363575e-005
30 9.77 8.595712e-008 1.136224e-005
50 13.92 1.175558e-008 1.166124e-006
100 27.06 5.406727e-008 1.177096e-006
The two-agents risk sharing model in an endowment economy has the same level of
difficulty than the standard repeated moral hazard model, as table 3 shows. With 10
grid points, the maximum error is less than 10−5. Again, the computational time is in
the order of few seconds.
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Table 4: Speed and Accuracy. Risk Sharing, Production Economy
Grid points Time (sec) Max Error Norm(Error)
2 2.03 8.194660e-002 1.313794e+001
4 11.34 4.366386e-003 6.193256e-001
6 209.68 2.613091e-004 3.645618e-002
7 773.75 6.527705e-005 9.096389e-003
8 2541.47 1.638221e-005 2.294711e-003
Finally, table 4 presents the statistics for the last example of risk sharing in a
production economy. This model has three endogenous state variables, therefore it
is more complicated to solve. However, also in this case we do not need a very fine
grid to get decent levels of accuracy. Computational time increases, but it is still at
tolerable levels (42 minutes with 8 grid points for each dimension). I conjecture that
the performance of the algorithm can be improved by combining collocation with the
Smolyak algorithm (see for example Malin et al. (2010)). In particular, Smolyak can be
useful for more complicated models , since it is well known that the collocation method
does not perform well for state spaces with more than 3 endogenous states variables.
6 Conclusions
The use of recursive Lagrangeans as a solution strategy is common for dynamic environ-
ment with full information, but not for private information setups. Sleet and Yeltekin
(2008a) open the way for applications with privately observed shocks. This paper does
the same for models with privately observed actions, and in particular proposes an
algorithm which is much faster than the traditional APS technique. This methodology
allows the researcher to deal with models with many states, and to calibrate simu-
lated series to real data in a reasonable amount of time. A large class of models which
are practically intractable under standard techniques can be easily addressed with the
techniques discussed here.
This method has many possible applications. Given the speed, the algorithm can
also be useful (as a time-saving technique) for solving those models that are tractable
with traditional techniques, but computationally burdensome. Dynamic agency prob-
lems with hidden effort and hidden assets are a good example: while there is a good
qualitative idea of the main predictions of this model, to the best of my knowledge
a quantitative assessment in a calibrated economy is still missing. Mainly this is due
to numerical difficulties. The Lagrangean approach offers a chance to overcome these
limits: it is easy to calibrate models and match data even in the hidden effort, hidden
assets economy. These techniques can be potentially helpful in the analysis of several
issues such as e.g. consumption-saving anomalies, optimal unemployment insurance
with assets accumulation or DSGE models with financial frictions.
However, the main gain of the Lagrangean method can be seen in more compli-
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cated setups, which are practically intractable with current state-of-the-art algorithms.
Models of repeated moral hazard with heterogeneous agents and endogenous states are
a good example: they require us to solve the problem of each agent and aggregate
the resulting individual optimal choices, before iterating until a general equilibrium is
found. In these cases, APS techniques are unmanageable even with just two endogenous
states, while with my approach it is a simple computational task. Other problems for
which the Lagrangean approach has a potential advantage are optimal taxation theory
in economies with hidden states and hidden actions, models of CEO compensation, and
models of banking and credit markets.
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A Proofs
In this Appendix A, I collect the proof of Proposition 1 and the characterization of the
optimal contract for the simple principal-agent model in section 2.
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A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1 Fix an arbitrary constant K > 0 and let Kθ = max {K,K ‖θ‖}. The
operator
(TKf) (s, θ) ≡ min
{χ>0:‖χ‖≤Kθ}
max
a,c
{
h (a, c, θ, χ, s) + β
∑
s′
π (s′ | s, a) f (s′, θ′ (s′))
}
s.t. θ′ (s′) = θ + χ
πa (s
′ | s, a)
π (s′ | s, a)
∀s′
is a contraction.
Proof. The space
M =
{
f : S × R2 −→ R s.t.
a) ∀α > 0 f (·, αθ) = αf (·, θ)
b) f (s, ·) is continuous and bounded }
will be our candidate, with norm
‖f‖ = sup {|f (s, θ)| : ‖θ‖ ≤ 1, s ∈ S}
Marcet and Marimon (2009) show thatM is a nonempty complete metric space. I have
to show that TK : M −→ M . Notice that
(TKf) (s, θ) = θh0 (a
∗, c∗, s) + χ∗h1 (a
∗, c∗, s) + β
∑
s′
π (s′ | s, a∗) f
(
s′, θ∗
′
(s′)
)
hence by Schwartz’s inequality
‖(TKf) (s, θ)‖ ≤ ‖θ‖ ‖h0 (a
∗, c∗, s)‖+max {K,K ‖θ‖} ‖h1 (a
∗, c∗, s)‖
+ β
(
max {K,K ‖θ‖}
∥∥∥∥πa (s′ | s, a∗)π (s′ | s, a∗)
∥∥∥∥+ ‖θ‖)∥∥∥∥f (s′, θ∗′ (s′)‖θ∗′ (s′)‖
)∥∥∥∥
and therefore (TKf) (s, φ) is bounded. A generalized Maximum Principle argument
gives continuity of (TKf) (s, φ). To check for homogeneity properties, let (a
∗, c∗, χ∗) be
such that
(TKf) (s, θ) = h (a
∗, c∗, θ, χ∗, s) + β
∑
s′
π (s′ | s, a∗) f
(
s′, θ∗
′
(s′)
)
Then for any α > 0 we get
α (TKf) (s, θ) = α
[
h (a∗, c∗, θ, χ∗, s) + β
∑
s′
π (s′ | s, a∗) f
(
s′, θ∗
′
(s′)
)]
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Therefore
h (a∗, c∗, αθ, αχ∗, s) + β
∑
s′
π (s′ | s, a∗) f
(
s′, αθ∗
′
(s′)
)
=
= α
[
h (a∗, c∗, θ, χ∗, s) + β
∑
s′
π (s′ | s, a∗) f
(
s′, θ∗
′
(s′)
)]
Now take a generic χ, then define θ′a∗ (s
′) = ϕ (αθ, χ, a∗, s′) and θ′a (s
′) = ϕ (θ, χ∗, a, s′)
for a feasible a. We can write:
h (a∗, c∗, αθ, χ, s) + β
∑
s′
π (s′ | s, a∗) f (s′, θ′a∗ (s
′))
= α
[
h
(
a∗, c∗, θ,
χ
α
, s
)
+ β
∑
s′
π (s′ | s, a∗) f
(
s′,
θ′a∗ (s
′)
α
)]
≥ α
[
h (a∗, c∗, θ, χ∗, s) + β
∑
s′
π (s′ | s, a∗) f (s′, θ∗′ (s′))
]
≥ α
[
h (a, c, θ, χ∗, s) + β
∑
s′
π (s′ | s, a) f (s′, θ′a (s
′))
]
and therefore
(TKf) (s, αθ) = h (a
∗, c∗, αθ, αχ∗, s) + β
∑
s′
π (s′ | s, a∗) f
(
s′, αθ∗
′
(s′)
)
= α (TKf) (s, θ)
and therefore the operator preserves the homogeneity properties. To see monotonicity,
let g, u ∈M such that g ≤ u. Therefore
max
a,c
{
h (a, c, θ, χ, s) + β
∑
s′
π (s′ | s, a) g (s′, θ′ (s′))
}
≤ max
a,c
{
h (a, c, θ, χ, s) + β
∑
s′
π (s′ | s, a) u (s′, θ′ (s′))
}
and then
min
{χ≥0:‖χ‖≤Kθ}
max
a,c
{
h (a, c, θ, χ, s) + β
∑
s′
π (s′ | s, a) g (s′, θ′ (s′))
}
≤ min
{χ≥0:‖χ‖≤Kθ}
max
a,c
{
h (a, c, θ, χ, s) + β
∑
s′
π (s′ | s, a)u (s′, θ′ (s′))
}
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which implies (TKg) (s, θ) ≤ (TKu) (s, θ). To see discounting, let k ∈ R+, and define
f + k ∈M as (f + k) (s, θ) = f (s, θ) + k. Therefore:
max
a,c
{
h (a, c, θ, χ, s) + β
∑
s′
π (s′ | s, a) (g + k) (s′, θ′ (s′))
}
= max
a,c
{
h (a, c, θ, χ, s) + β
∑
s′
π (s′ | s, a) g (s′, θ′ (s′)) + βk
}
= max
a,c
{
h (a, c, θ, χ, s) + β
∑
s′
π (s′ | s, a) g (s′, θ′ (s′))
}
+ βk
Hence we get
TK (f + k) (s, θ) =
= min
{χ≥0:‖χ‖≤Kθ}
max
a,c
{
h (a, c, θ, χ, s) + β
∑
s′
π (s′ | s, a) (f + k) (s′, θ′ (s′))
}
= min
{χ≥0:‖χ‖≤Kθ}
max
a,c
{
h (a, c, θ, χ, s) + β
∑
s′
π (s′ | s, a) f (s′, θ′ (s′))
}
+ βk
= (TKf) (s, θ) + βk
and then TK (f + k) ≤ TKf + βk. Now it is possible to use the above properties to
show the contraction property for the operator TK . In order to see this, let f, g ∈ M .
By homogeneity, we get
f (s, θ) = g (s, θ) + f (s, θ)− g (s, θ)
≤ g (s, θ) + |f (s, θ)− g (s, θ)|
and then
f (s, θ) ≤ g (s, θ) + ‖f (s, θ)− g (s, θ)‖
Now applying the operator TK and using monotonicity and discounting we get:
(TKf) (s, θ) ≤ TK (g + ‖f − g‖) (s, θ)
≤ (TKg) (s, θ) + β ‖f − g‖
which implies finally
‖TKf − TKg‖ ≤ β ‖f − g‖
and given β ∈ (0, 1) this concludes the proof that the operator TK is a contraction.
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A.2 Characterization of the optimal contract
In this section I show some properties of the optimal contract. These properties are the
analogue, under the Lagrangean approach, of well known results in the literature. Let
us go back to the problem with φ
0
= 1. We can take the first order conditions of the
Lagrangean:
ct
(
st
)
: 0 = −1 + φt
(
st
)
uc
(
ct
(
st
))
(25)
at
(
st
)
: 0 = −λt
(
st
)
υ′′
(
at
(
st
))
− φt
(
st
)
υ′
(
at
(
st
))
+ (26)
+
∞∑
j=1
βj
∑
st+j|st
πa (st+1 | st, at (s
t))
π (st+1 | st, at (st))
{
y (st)− ct
(
st
)
− λt+j (st+j) υ
′
(
at+j
(
st+j
))
−
+φt+j
(
st+j
) [
u
(
ct+j
(
st+j
))
− υ
(
at+j
(
st+j
))]}
Π
(
st+j | st, at+j−1
(
st+j−1
))
+
+ βλt
(
st
) ∑
st+1|st
∂
(
pia(·)
pi(·)
)
∂a
[
u
(
ct+1
(
st+1
))
− υ
(
at+1
(
st+1
))]
π
(
st+1 | st, at
(
st
))
and
λt
(
st
)
: 0 = −υ′
(
at
(
st
) )
+
∞∑
j=1
∑
st+j |st
πa (st+1 | st, at (s
t))
π (st+1 | st, at (st))
× (27)
×
[
βj
[
u
(
ct+j
(
st+j
))
− υ
(
at+j
(
st+j
))]
Π
(
st+j | st, at+j−1
(
st+j−1 | st
))]
Lemma 1 makes clear how φt (s
t) incorporates the promises of the principal. From (25)
we can see that ct+1 (s
t+1) = u−1c
(
1
φt+1(st+1)
)
, then ct+1 (s
t+1) is increasing in φt+1 (s
t+1).
Lemma 1 says that, tomorrow, the principal will reward a high income realization with
higher consumption than today, and a low income realization with lower consumption
than today26.
Lemma 1 In the optimal contract, φt+1 (s
t, ŝ1) < φt (s
t) < φt+1 (s
t, ŝI) for any t.
Proof. Notice first that, for any t, ∃i, j : πa (ŝi | st, a
∗
t (s
t)) > 0 and πa (ŝj | st, at (s
t)) <
0. Suppose not: then the only possibility is that πa (ŝi | st, at (s
t)) = 0 for any i
(otherwise,
∑̂
si
πa (ŝi | st, at (s
t)) 6= 0, which is impossible). This implies, by (27),
0 = υ′ (at (s
t)) which is a contradiction since υ (·) is strictly increasing. Adding the
full support assumption and the fact that λt (s
t) > 0, we get that ∃i, j : φt+1 (s
t, ŝj) <
φt (s
t) < φt+1 (s
t, ŝi). By MLRC, φt+1 (s
t, ŝ1) ≤ φt+1 (s
t, ŝj) for any j and φt+1 (s
t, ŝi) ≤
φt+1 (s
t, ŝI) for any i, which proves the statement.
The following Proposition characterizes the long run properties of the Pareto Negishi
weight.
26Thomas and Worrall (1990) prove the same property with APS techniques.
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Proposition 3 φt (s
t) is a martingale that converges to zero.
Proof. Use the law of motion of φt (s
t) and take expectations on both sides:∑
st+1
φt+1
(
st, st+1
)
π
(
st+1 | st, at
(
st
))
=
= φt
(
st
)
+ λt
(
st
)∑
st+1
πa (st+1 | st, at (s
t))
π (st+1 | st, at (st))
π
(
st+1 | st, at
(
st
))
Notice that λt (s
t)
∑
st+1
pia(st+1|st,at(st))
pi(st+1|st,at(st))
π (st+1 | st, at (s
t)) = 0, which implies
Eat
[
φt+1 | s
t
]
= φt
(
st
)
(28)
where Eat [·] is the expectation operator induced by at (s
t). Therefore φt (s
t) is a mar-
tingale. To see that it converges to zero, rewrite (28) by using (25):
Eat
[
1
uc (ct+1 (st+1))
]
=
1
uc (ct (st))
By Inada conditions, 1
uc(ct(st))
is bounded above zero and below infinity. Therefore φt (s
t)
is a nonnegative martingale, and by Doob’s theorem it converges almost surely to a
random variable (call it X). To see that X = 0 almost surely, I follow the proof strategy
of Thomas and Worrall (1990), to which I refer for details. Suppose not, and take a
path {st}
∞
t=0 such that lim
t→∞
φt (s
t) = φ > 0 and state ŝI happens infinitely many times.
I claim that this sequence cannot exist. Take a subsequence
{
st(k)
}∞
k=1
of {st}∞t=0 such
that st(k) = ŝI ∀k. This subsequence has to converge to some limit φ > 0, since at some
point will be in a ǫ-neighborhood of φ for some ǫ > 0. Call f (φt (s
t) , ŝi) = φt+1 (s
t, ŝi)
and notice that f (·) is continuous, hence lim
k→∞
f
(
φt(k)
(
st(k)
)
, ŝI
)
= f
(
φ, ŝI
)
. By
definition, f
(
φt(k)
(
st(k)
)
, ŝI
)
= φt(k)+1 (s
t, ŝI), then lim
k→∞
φt(k)+1
(
st(k), ŝI
)
= f
(
φ, ŝI
)
.
However, notice that it must be lim
k→∞
φt(k)
(
st(k)
)
= φ and lim
k→∞
φt(k)+1
(
st(k), ŝI
)
= φ.
But by Lemma 1, φt(k)
(
st(k)
)
< φt(k)+1
(
st(k), ŝI
)
for any k. Therefore, we have a
contradiction and this sequence cannot exist. Since paths where state ŝI occurs only a
finite number of times have probability zero, this implies that
Pr
{
lim
t→∞
φt
(
st
)
> 0
}
= 0
which implies X = 0 almost surely.
Proposition 3 is the well known result that 1
uc(ct(st))
evolves as a martingale (see
Rogerson (1985a)). The a.s.-convergence to zero is the so called immiseration property
that implies zero consumption almost surely as t → ∞, which is a standard result in
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models with asymmetric information (see Thomas and Worrall (1990), for example). In
this framework, the immiseration property has an intuitive interpretation: in order to
keep strong incentives for the agent, the planner must ensure that the Pareto-Negishi
weight goes to zero almost surely as t→∞ for any possible sequence of realizations of
the income shock.
The result in Proposition 3 is obtained by using the law of motion of φt (s
t) and
(25), which yields
Eat
[
1
uc (ct+1 (st+1))
]
=
1
uc (ct (st))
We can use Jensen’s inequality and the strict concavity of u (·) to get that Eat [uc (ct+1 (s
t+1))] >
uc (ct (s
t)): the profile of expected consumption is decreasing across time.
B Hidden assets
B.1 Recursivity
Define the following generalized version of the problem:
W SWFθ (s0) = max
{at(st),ct(st)}
∞
t=0∈Γ
HA
φ
0
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
βt
[
y (st)− ct
(
st
)]
Π
(
st | s0, a
t−1
(
st−1
))
+
+ γ
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
βt
(
u
(
ct
(
st
))
− υ
(
at
(
st
)))
Π
(
st | s0, a
t−1
(
st−1
))
s.t. υ′
(
at
(
st
))
=
∞∑
j=1
βj
∑
st+j|st
πa (st+1 | st, at (s
t))
π (st+1 | st, at (st))
×
×
[
u
(
ct+j
(
st+j
))
− υ
(
at+j
(
st+j
))]
Π
(
st+j | st, at+j−1
(
st+j−1 | st
))
∀st, t ≥ 0
u′
(
ct
(
st
))
= βR
∑
st+1
u′
(
ct+1
(
st, st+1
))
π
(
st+1 | st, at
(
st
) )
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The Lagrangean is:
Lθ (s0, γ, c
∞,a∞, λ∞, η∞) =
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
βt
{
φ
0 [
y (st)− ct
(
st
)]
+
+γ
[
u
(
ct
(
st
))
− υ
(
at
(
st
))]}
Π
(
st | s0, a
t−1
(
st−1
))
+
−
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
βtλt
(
st
)υ′ (at (st) )−
∞∑
j=1
βj
∑
st+j|st
πa (st+1 | st, at (s
t))
π (st+1 | st, at (st))
×
×
[
u
(
ct+j
(
st+j
))
− υ
(
at+j
(
st+j
))]
Π
(
st+j | st, at+j−1
(
st+j−1 | st
))}
×
× Π
(
st | s0, a
t−1
(
st−1
))
+
+
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
βtηt
(
st
) [
uc
(
ct
(
st
))
− βR
∑
st+1
uc
(
ct+1
(
st+1
))
π
(
st+1 | st, at
(
st
))]
×
× Π
(
st | s0, a
t−1
(
st−1
))
Notice that r (a, c, s) ≡ y (s) − c is uniformly bounded by debt limits, therefore there
exists a lower bound κ such that r (a, c, s) ≥ κ. As before, we can define κ <
κ
1−β
, ϕ1 (φ, λ, s′) ≡ φ + λpia(s
′|s,a)
pi(s′|s,a)
, ϕ2 (ζ, η, s′) ≡ η, Ψ (φ, ζ, λ, η, s′) ≡
[
ϕ1 (φ, λ, s′)
ϕ2 (ζ, η, s′)
]
,
hP0 (a, c, s) ≡ r (a, c, s), h
P
1 (a, c, s) ≡ r (a, c, s)−κ, h
ICC
0 (a, c, s) ≡ u (c)−υ (a), h
ICC
1 (a, c, s) ≡
−υ′ (a), hEE0 (a, c, s) ≡ −Ru
′
c (c), h
EE
1 (a, c, s) ≡ u
′
c (c), θ ≡
[
φ0 φ ζ
]
∈ R3, χ ≡[
λ0 λ η
]
and
h (a, c, θ, χ, s) ≡ θh0 (a, c, s) + χh1 (a, c, s)
≡
[
φ0 φ ζ
]  hP0 (a, c, s)hICC0 (a, c, s)
hEE0 (a, c, s)
+ [λ0 λ η]
 hP1 (a, c, s)hICC1 (a, c, s)
hEE1 (a, c, s)

which is homogenous of degree 1 in (θ, χ). The Lagrangean can be written as:
Lθ (s0, γ, c
∞,a∞, χ∞) =
=
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
βth
(
at
(
st
)
, ct
(
st
)
, θt
(
st
)
, χt
(
st
)
, st
)
Π
(
st | s0, a
t−1
(
st−1
))
where
θt+1
(
st, ŝ
)
= Ψ
(
θt
(
st
)
, χt
(
st
)
, ŝ
)
∀ŝ ∈ S
θ0
(
s0
)
=
[
φ
0
γ 0
]
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We can associate a saddle point functional equation to this Lagrangean
J (s, θ) = min
χ
max
a,c
{
h (a, c, θ, χ, s) + β
∑
s′
π (s′ | s, a) J (s′, θ′ (s′))
}
(29)
s.t. θ′ (s′) = Ψ (θ, χ, s′) ∀s′
The following Proposition shows that the RHS operator is a contraction mapping.
Proposition 4 Fix an arbitrary constant K > 0 and let Kθ = max {K,K ‖θ‖}. The
operator
(TKf) (s, θ) ≡ min
{χ>0:‖χ‖≤Kθ}
max
a,c
{
h (a, c, θ, χ, s) + β
∑
s′
π (s′ | s, a) f (s′, θ′ (s′))
}
s.t. θ′ (s′) = Ψ (θ, χ, s′) ∀s′
is a contraction.
Proof. Straightforward by repeating the steps to prove Proposition 1 in the following
space of functions:
M =
{
f : S × R3 −→ R s.t.
a) ∀α > 0 f (·, αθ) = αf (·, θ)
b) f (s, ·) is continuous and bounded }
with norm
‖f‖ = sup {|f (s, θ)| : ‖θ‖ ≤ 1, s ∈ S}
B.2 The verification procedure
No conditions are known under which the first-order approach is guaranteed to be valid
in the framework with hidden effort and hidden assets. Therefore, we cannot be sure
that the first-order approach delivers the correct optimal allocation: it is possible that
the solution obtained does not satisfies the true incentive compatibility constraint of
the original problem. However we can verify it by a simple numerical procedure similar
to the one proposed by Abraham and Pavoni (2009): we remaximize the lifetime utility
of the agent, by taking as given the optimal transfer scheme implied by the solution of
the Pareto problem; if remaximization delivers a welfare gain to the agent, the solution
obtained with the first-order approach does not satisfy incentive compatibility. Instead,
if no gain is possible, then the first-order approach is valid.
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We solve the following problem:
V (s0, b−1, γ, 0) =
= max
{cVt (st),aVt (st),bVt (st)}
∞
t=0
∈Γ
{
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
βt
[
u
(
cVt
(
st
))
− υ
(
aVt
(
st
))]
Π
(
st | s0, a
V,t−1
(
st−1
))}
s.t. cVt
(
st
)
+ bVt
(
st
)
= y (st) + T (st, φt
(
st
)
, ζt
(
st
)
) +RbVt−1
(
st−1
)
b−1 given
φt+1
(
st, ŝ)
)
= ϕ1(ŝ, φt
(
st
)
, ζt
(
st
)
) ∀ŝ ∈ S and φ0
(
s0
)
= γ
ζt+1
(
st, ŝ
)
= ϕ2(ŝ, φt
(
st
)
, ζt
(
st
)
) ∀ŝ ∈ S and ζ0
(
s0
)
= 0
where T (·), ϕ1(·) and ϕ2(·) are the policy functions derived from Lagrangean (19), and
are exogenous from the point of view of the agent (they define the transfer policy of the
principal). It is obvious that this problem is recursive in the state space (s, φ, ζ, b), but
notice that φ and ζ are exogenous states. As in Abraham and Pavoni (2009), I solve
this dynamic optimization problem by value function iteration on collocation nodes with
linear interpolation, to be sure I do not force the code to yield a smooth value function
(this is important if the problem is not concave). Once we get the value function
of the agent’s problem, we can calculate the welfare gain from reoptimization with
respect to the optimal allocation obtained with the first-order approach. In particular,
we compare the value obtained with the verification procedure and the value implied
by the Lagrangean approach: if their difference is zero (in numerical terms), then
the Lagrangean first-order method delivers the solution of the original problem. As
Abraham and Pavoni (2009) suggest, there can be approximation issues when comparing
the two value functions27, therefore a non-zero cut-off value must be carefully chosen
to take into account this problem.
C Bond holdings
I show how to recover bond holdings from the solution of the Lagrangean problem, for
the simplest case of a dynamic principal-agent model and for the model with hidden
27Notice that we can end up with a very different accuracy in the two procedures due to hardware
limitations. In general, the Lagrangean approach (in which we solve nonlinear equations) has a high
degree of accuracy even with few grid points (around ten for each state variable in a rectangular grid),
while the value function iteration used in the verification procedure needs many grid points to get a
decent degree of approximation (say around 1000 for each state variable to get a level of accuracy of
the same magnitude of the Lagrangean approach). See for example Judd (1998) for a discussion of
this issue.
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assets.
C.1 Repeated moral hazard
We can define bond holdings recursively as:
bt
(
st
)
= −Eat
∞∑
j=1
βj (yt+j − ct+j) =
= −Eat
∞∑
j=1
βj {(yt+j − ct+j) + φt+j [u (ct+j)− υ (at+j)]− λt+jυ
′ (at+j)}+
+ Eat
∞∑
j=1
βj {φt+j [u (ct+j)− υ (at+j)]− λt+jυ
′ (at+j)}
= −βEat J (yt+1, φt+1) + E
a
t
∞∑
j=1
βj {φt+j [u (ct+j)− υ (at+j)]− λt+jυ
′ (at+j)}
= −βEat J (yt+1, φt+1) + E
a
t
∞∑
j=1
βj {φt+j [u (ct+j)− υ (at+j)]}
−Eat
∞∑
j=1
βjλt+jE
a
t+1
∞∑
k=0
βk
πa (at+j+1)
π (at+j+1)
[u (ct+j+k+1)− υ (at+j+k+1)]
= −βEat J (yt+1, φt+1) + E
a
t
∞∑
j=1
βj {φt+j [u (ct+j)− υ (at+j)]}
−Eat
∞∑
j=1
βjλt+j
πa (at+j)
π (at+j)
U (st+j+1, φt+j+1)
and notice that
φ∗tU (st, φ
∗
t ) = φ
∗
t [u (c
∗
t )− υ (a
∗
t )] + φ
∗
tβE
a
t U
(
st+1, φ
∗
t+1
)
= φ∗t [u (c
∗
t )− υ (a
∗
t )] + βE
a
t φ
∗
t
φ∗t+1
φ∗t+1
U
(
st+1, φ
∗
t+1
)
= φ∗t [u (c
∗
t )− υ (a
∗
t )] + βE
a
t
φ∗t
φ∗t+1
φ∗t+1U
(
st+1, φ
∗
t+1
)
= φ∗t [u (c
∗
t )− υ (a
∗
t )] + βE
a
t φ
∗
t+1U
(
st+1, φ
∗
t+1
)
=
= φ∗t [u (c
∗
t )− υ (a
∗
t )] + E
a
t
∞∑
j=1
βjφ∗t+j
[
u
(
c∗t+j
)
− υ
(
a∗t+j
)]
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due to homogeneity of degree zero of the policy functions and of U (s, ·). Therefore
bt
(
st
)
= −βEat J (yt+1, φt+1) + βE
a
t φt+1U (yt+1, φt+1)
− Eat
∞∑
j=1
βjλt+j
πa (at+j)
π (at+j)
U (st+j+1, φt+j+1)
by Abel’s formula = −βEat J (yt+1, φt+1) + βE
a
t φt+1U (yt+1, φt+1)
− Eat
∞∑
j=1
βj (φt+j+1 − φt+1)
[
u
(
c∗t+j+1
)
− υ
(
a∗t+j+1
)]
= −βEat J (yt+1, φt+1) + βE
a
t φt+1U (yt+1, φt+1)
− Eat
∞∑
j=1
βj (φt+j+1)
[
u
(
c∗t+j+1
)
− υ
(
a∗t+j+1
)]
+ Eat
∞∑
j=1
βjφt+1
[
u
(
c∗t+j+1
)
− υ
(
a∗t+j+1
)]
= −βEat J (yt+1, φt+1) + βE
a
t φt+1
[
U (yt+1, φt+1) + E
a
t+1U (yt+2, φt+2)
]
− βEat φt+2U (yt+2, φt+2)
= −βEat J (yt+1, φt+1) + βE
a
t φt+1 [U (yt+1, φt+1)]
− Eat λt+1
πa (at+1)
π (at+1)
βEat+1U (yt+2, φt+2)
which can be rewritten as
bt
(
st
)
= −βEat J (yt+1, φt+1) + βE
a
t φt+1U (yt+1, φt+1)
− Eat λt+1
πa (at+1)
π (at+1)
[
U (yt+1, φt+1)− u
(
c∗t+1
)
+ υ
(
a∗t+1
)]
where the second line is due to the optimality of the contract.
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C.2 Hidden assets
Starting from the previous result, in this case we can write
bt
(
st
)
= −Eat
∞∑
j=1
βj (yt+j − ct+j) =
− βEat J (yt+1, φt+1) + βE
a
t φt+1U (yt+1, φt+1)−
−Eat λt+1
πa (at+1)
π (at+1)
[
U (yt+1, φt+1)− u
(
c∗t+1
)
+ υ
(
a∗t+1
)]
−
−Eat
∞∑
j=1
βj
[
ηt+j − β
−1ζt+j
]
u′ (ct+j)
= −βEat J (yt+1, φt+1) + βE
a
t φt+1U (yt+1, φt+1)−
−Eat λt+1
πa (at+1)
π (at+1)
[
U (yt+1, φt+1)− u
(
c∗t+1
)
+ υ
(
a∗t+1
)]
−Eat
∞∑
j=1
βj
[
ηt+j − β
−1ζt+j
]
u′ (ct+j)−E
a
t ζt+1u
′ (ct+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 by definition
+ Eat ζt+1u
′ (ct+1)
= −βEat J (yt+1, φt+1) + βE
a
t φt+1U (yt+1, φt+1)−
−Eat λt+1
πa (at+1)
π (at+1)
[
U (yt+1, φt+1)− u
(
c∗t+1
)
+ υ
(
a∗t+1
)]
+
+ Eat ζt+1u
′ (ct+1)
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Figure 1: Pure moral hazard: policy functions
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Figure 2: Pure moral hazard: policy functions (cont.)
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Figure 3: Pure moral hazard, average over 50000 independent simulations
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Figure 4: Pure moral hazard, average over 50000 independent simulations (cont.)
44
−34 −32 −30 −28 −26 −24 −22
−6
−5
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
1
2
Pareto Frontier
Agent expect. utility
Pl
an
ne
r e
xp
ec
t. 
ut
ilit
y
Figure 5: Pure moral hazard: Pareto frontier
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Figure 6: Moral hazard with hidden assets, policy functions
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Figure 7: Moral hazard with hidden assets, policy functions (cont.)
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Figure 8: Moral hazard with hidden assets, average over 50000 independent simulations
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Figure 9: Moral hazard with hidden assets, average over 50000 independent simulations
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Figure 10: Pure moral hazard: Pareto frontier
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Figure 11: Risk sharing with moral hazard, policy functions (2 agents)
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Figure 12: Risk sharing with moral hazard, policy functions (2 agents) (cont.)
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Figure 13: Risk sharing with moral hazard, sample path (2 agents)
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Figure 14: Risk sharing with moral hazard, sample path (2 agents) (cont.)
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Figure 15: Risk sharing with moral hazard, Pareto frontier (2 agents)
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Figure 16: Production economy: sample path
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Figure 17: Production economy: sample path (cont.)
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Figure 18: Production economy: average over 50000 simulations
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Figure 19: Production economy: average over 50000 simulations (cont.)
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